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In 2001, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) implemented 
a new electronic surveillance system (SurvNet) for infec-
tious disease outbreaks in Germany. SurvNet has captured 
30,578 outbreak reports in 2001–2005. The size of the out-
breaks ranged from 2 to 527 cases. For outbreaks reported 
in 2002–2005, the median duration from notiﬁ  cation of the 
ﬁ  rst case to the local health department until receipt of the 
outbreak report at RKI was 7 days. Median outbreak dura-
tion ranged from 1 day (caused by Campylobacter) up to 
73 days (caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis). The most 
common settings among the 10,008 entries for 9,946 out-
breaks in 2004 and 2005 were households (5,262; 53%), 
nursing homes (1,218; 12%), and hospitals (1,248; 12%). 
SurvNet may be a useful tool for other outbreak surveillance 
systems because it minimizes the workload of local health 
departments and captures outbreaks even when causative 
pathogens have not yet been identiﬁ  ed. 
S
urveillance of infectious disease outbreaks is important 
because outbreaks often require immediate interven-
tion by the public health service. In addition, outbreaks 
may indicate deﬁ  ciencies in infection control management 
and provide unique opportunities to investigate clinical and 
epidemiologic characteristics of the infectious agents, par-
ticularly in emerging infectious diseases. Timely and com-
prehensive outbreak reports need to be available not only at 
the affected administrative level but also at state, national, 
and international levels to detect and control multistate out-
breaks (1–4). Electronic documentation and transmission 
of data are needed for rapid information exchange between 
institutions in charge of conducting, coordinating, or re-
porting control measures and should minimize additional 
work load for the public health service (5).
International regulations have resulted in increased 
requirements for outbreak reporting from the local to the 
international level (6,7). One of the major changes in the 
new International Health Regulations enacted in May 2005 
is that infectious disease outbreaks of international concern 
must be reported to the World Health Organization, irre-
spective of the pathogens involved (8). Moreover, member 
states of the European Union are already obligated to report 
foodborne outbreaks to the relevant European Union insti-
tution according to the regulation on monitoring of zoono-
ses and zoonotic agents (9).
Outbreak surveillance for emerging infectious dis-
eases is a particular challenge because small independent 
outbreaks may occur before they are recognized as part 
of a larger epidemiologic phenomenon. The complex-
ity, the prolonged persistence of outbreaks, and the dif-
fering degree to which outbreaks are investigated locally 
make it much more difﬁ  cult to ensure standardized and 
timely surveillance of outbreaks compared with surveil-
lance of sporadic cases (10). To overcome these problems, 
the RKI (the federal institution responsible for infectious 
disease surveillance in Germany) developed the software 
and implemented an electronic outbreak reporting system 
(SurvNet) as part of its existing electronic surveillance sys-
tem for notiﬁ  able diseases. SurvNet was fully implemented 
in January 2001 at all administrative levels of the German 
Public Health system and, in January 2006, at all levels of 
the German armed forces. The objective of the system is 
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timely and easily retrievable epidemiologic information 
exchange on outbreaks at the local, state, and national lev-
els. We describe the system, present epidemiologic aspects 
of reported outbreaks, and discuss the strengths and weak-
nesses after 5 years of practical use in Germany.
Material and Methods
Electronic Transmission of Data 
All 431 local health departments in Germany verify 
locally identiﬁ  ed notiﬁ  able diseases with reference to na-
tional case deﬁ  nitions and send case reports electronically 
through the 16 state health departments to the national sur-
veillance unit at RKI. The SurvNet software organizes the 
electronic transmission of case-based datasets from periph-
eral databases in each local health department to databases 
of the respective state health department and ﬁ  nally to the 
RKI (11,12). The system transmits data to the RKI on all 
cases in Germany but without identiﬁ  able information on 
the persons involved. In contrast, a local health department 
has full data on all cases from their jurisdiction (11). The 
data collected in this system includes demographic charac-
teristics, time, place, diagnostics, case deﬁ  nition criteria, 
exposure to risk factors, and associations with outbreaks as 
well as administrative data on where, when, and by whom 
the dataset is being installed and modiﬁ  ed.
Outbreak Reporting
Single case records can be linked together in the 
SurvNet database by creating an outbreak report as a new 
database unit. Several outbreak reports at the local level 
can be further combined, which results in meta-outbreak 
reports (Figure). This so called “inverted tree” structure 
allows documentation of multicounty and multistate out-
breaks (13). Outbreak reports can also be linked with out-
breaks that initially were thought to be unlinked but are 
later identiﬁ  ed as being part of the same epidemiologic 
event. Staff at local or state health departments, as well 
as at RKI, can electronically link outbreaks on the basis 
of epidemiologic evidence such as person, place, time, 
and pathogen; they can also manually enter descriptive 
categorizations based on the information provided by the 
outbreak reports that form part of this meta-outbreak (on-
line Appendix Figure, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/10/1548-appG.htm). 
Information Structure
The qualitative characteristics of the outbreak are cov-
ered by 7 sections: geographic setting, food consumption, 
bloodborne diseases, animal contact, waterborne diseases, 
person-to-person contact, and molecular ﬁ  ngerprinting. 
Each section includes a list of standardized items, of which 
>1 can be selected. Food consumption, for example, con-
tains a selection of standardized food items deﬁ  ned by the 
ﬁ  rst hierarchical order of the Eurocode 2 Food Coding Sys-
tem (14), a system developed to serve as a standard instru-
ment for nutritional surveys in Europe.
Each selected exposure in the different sections is ad-
ditionally categorized by using standardized evidence cat-
egories (Table 1). These range from “exposure conﬁ  rmed 
by signiﬁ  cant association in case-control or cohort study” 
to “majority of the cases of this outbreak had this particular 
exposure.” For example, the category “breach of applicable 
standard recommendations supports epidemiologic link” is 
applicable if an outbreak investigation associated with meat 
consumption shows that consumed meat was not properly 
cooked. In addition to these standardized variables, results 
from molecular analysis of pathogens and complementary 
narrative information, such as anecdotal evidence, can also 
be included and categorized as “other information.”
Outbreaks are generally linked to >1 pathogens identi-
ﬁ  ed as the causative agent(s) of the outbreak. For notiﬁ  able 
pathogens, the system provides a speciﬁ  c set of variables to 
allow validation against the respective case deﬁ  nition. Re-
garding pathogens for which sporadic cases are not notiﬁ  -
able, the agent can be selected from a list of 133 known hu-
man pathogens.  If a pathogen cannot be detected, the cases 
can still be transmitted as part of an outbreak. The system 
automatically generates an outbreak proﬁ  le consisting of 
general tables and graphs on the descriptive epidemiology 
of the outbreak, including epidemic curves, categoriza-
tions by age and sex, and geographic distribution of cases. 
Statistical overviews of reported outbreaks are published 
in the annual epidemiologic report on infectious diseases 
in April or May after the reporting year (15). Outbreaks 
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Figure. Inverted tree structure for organizing electronic outbreak 
reporting at different administrative levels.RESEARCH
of special interest are highlighted in short proﬁ  les in the 
weekly Epidemiological Bulletin, which may be followed 
by full outbreak reports in the same bulletin or other scien-
tiﬁ  c journals (16).
Outbreaks and Statistical Analyses
Data presented in this article cover all outbreaks re-
ported to the RKI from 2001 through December 2005 as of 
July 31, 2006. After the German infectious disease control 
law was passed, an outbreak was deﬁ  ned as >2 cases with 
an epidemiologic link (12). A case was considered epide-
miologically conﬁ  rmed if the clinical picture and an epide-
miologic link to at least 1 laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case was 
present as speciﬁ  ed by the national case deﬁ  nition for the 
respective disease (17), e.g., a person with diarrhea and no 
laboratory diagnosis who had ingested the same implicated 
food item as >1 patients with laboratory conﬁ  rmed salmo-
nellosis. Outbreaks, which were part of a meta-outbreak, 
were not counted separately because the case data were al-
ready included in the respective meta-outbreak (Figure). 
Unless otherwise speciﬁ  ed, analyses were limited to 
outbreaks caused by notiﬁ  able pathogens deﬁ  ned by the na-
tional surveillance case deﬁ  nitions (18). Duration of an out-
break was deﬁ  ned as the interval between the onset of the 
ﬁ  rst and the last case of the outbreak. Date of diagnosis was 
used if date of onset was missing. Reporting delay between 
the different public health levels was based on the electron-
ic time stamps for entering respective data into the database 
and arrival at the RKI. Reporting delay was computed for 
the years 2002 through 2005, as technical constraints did 
not allow these analyses for the 2001 data. Chi-square test-
ing was used to compare the proportion of outbreaks with 
food as a source for various pathogens. 
The system for documenting qualitative descriptions 
of the outbreaks has undergone major revisions over the 
years. Therefore, data on these details are presented only 
for the years 2004 and 2005, to ensure a consistent and 
comparable data structure. Microsoft SQL Server 2005 
(Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA, USA) was used for da-
tabase management. For the descriptive statistics, we used 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 15.0 for 
Windows, Version 15.0/1 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Results
From January 2001 through December 2005, a total of 
30,578 outbreaks associated with notiﬁ  able pathogens were 
reported to RKI. Of 1,340,487 cases of notiﬁ  able diseases 
reported to RKI during this period, 253,720 cases (19%) 
were part of a reported outbreak; the rest were reported as 
sporadic cases (Table 2). Of these outbreaks, 90% were 
caused by pathogens of the intestinal tract (e.g., Salmonel-
la, norovirus, rotavirus, hepatitis A virus, enteropathogenic 
Escherichia coli, and Campylobacter), and 10% (3,201) 
were caused by inﬂ  uenza virus (713), Mycobacterium tu-
berculosis (637), measles virus (501), and others (1,350, 
by 47 notiﬁ  able pathogens) (12). The size of the outbreaks 
ranged from 2 to 527 cases. Table 3 shows the number 
and duration of outbreaks by size and pathogens and indi-
cates that duration increases with the size of the outbreak. 
The longest median durations were observed in outbreaks 
caused by hepatitis A virus (22 days) and by M. tuberculo-
sis (73 days).
In addition to the 30,578 outbreaks associated with 
notiﬁ  able pathogens, 772 outbreaks were reported but not 
associated with any speciﬁ  c pathogen; 155 outbreaks were 
associated with pathogens that are not notiﬁ  able as single 
cases. Among these 155 outbreaks, 25 (16.8%) were as-
sociated with varicella-zoster virus, 26 (16.1%) Staphy-
lococcus spp., 24 (15.5%) Sarcoptes scabiei, 16 (10.3%) 
coxsackie virus, 15 (9.7%) adenovirus (nonconjunctivi-
tis), 11 (7.1%) Streptococcus spp., 10 (6.5%) astrovirus, 
and 28 (18.1%) outbreaks with 1 of 16 other pathogens. 
The distribution of these pathogens did not show any sig-
niﬁ  cant change over the years. The size, duration, and 
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Table 1. Levels of evidence supporting associations with named exposures, reported infectious disease outbreaks, 2004 and 2005,
Germany 
No. exposures (%) 
Level of evidence 
Geographic 
setting
Person-to-
person Food Blood Water Animal All
Pathogen (in linked person or environmental 
sample) indicates epidemiologic link 
98
(1.4)
3,544
(64.7)
65
(3.8)
4
(1.3)
3
(3.5)
8
(13.6)
3,722
(25.2)
Significant association by epidemiologic study 
(e.g., case control or cohort study) 
763
(10.7)
369
(6.7)
139
(8.2)
148
(47.3)
5
(5.9)
2
(3.4)
1,426
(9.7)
Most cases had same exposure  6,063
(85.2)
1,361
(24.8)
1,342
(79.4)
60
(19.2)
44
(51.8)
32
(54.2)
8,902
(60.4)
Breach of applicable standard 
recommendations supports epidemiologic link 
N/A N/A 57
(3.4)
28
(8.9)
3
(3.5)
2
(3.4)
90
(0.6)
Other reasons  191
(2.7)
207
(3.8)
88
(5.2)
73
(23.3)
30
(35.3)
15
(25.4)
604
(4.1)
All entries  7,115
(100)
5,481
(100)
1,691
(100)
313
(100)
85
(100)
59
(100)
14,744
(100)
All outbreaks  7,074 5,400 1,637 311 85 59 14,566Electronic Surveillance for Infectious Disease Outbreaks
reporting delay for these different kinds of outbreaks are 
compared in Table 4. 
A location setting was reported for 9,946 outbreaks 
(33%). Of 10,008 listed items, the most frequently named 
categories were households (5,262; 53%), nursing homes 
(1,218; 12%), hospitals (1,248; 12%), and kindergartens 
(783; 8%) (Table 5). 
In the 13,422 outbreaks reported in 2004 and 2005, at 
least 1 exposure associated with the outbreak was reported 
in 10,205 (76%) outbreaks, which added up to a total of 
22,001 ﬁ  eld entries (average 2.2 entries per outbreak). For 
15,978 (66%) of these 24,208 ﬁ  eld entries, an evidence 
category was provided by the reporting local health de-
partments. The distribution of these categories is shown in 
Table 1. In 954 (9.3 %) of all 10,205 outbreaks linked to a 
speciﬁ  c exposure, the evidence of this linkage was based 
on a statistically signiﬁ  cant association in a case-control or 
cohort study. For the 2,195 outbreaks with >10 cases, this 
type of evidence was reported in 248 (11.3 %) outbreaks, 
compared with 706 (8.8%) of the 7,998 outbreaks with <10 
cases relative risk (RR) = 1.3, χ2 = 12.5, p<0.001. 
For 1,637 (64%) of the 2,554 outbreaks in 2004 and 
2005 that were linked to food, information was available 
about the evidence on which the association was based. 
For 204 (12%) of these, the linkage was supported by ei-
ther statistically signiﬁ  cant association or by detection of 
the causative pathogen in a food sample. In these 12% of 
outbreaks in which the exposure linkage was supported by 
the 2 latter methods, the proportion of outbreaks linked to 
food varied between causative pathogens. In 999 of such 
outbreaks caused by S. enteritidis spp., 14% (141) were 
associated with food either by a statistically signiﬁ  cant 
association or by detection of the causative pathogen in a 
food sample; this association was found for 8% (28 of 359) 
Campylobacter outbreaks, 1% (16 of 1,239) norovirus out-
breaks, and 0.2% (2 of 940) rotavirus outbreaks (χ2 = 215.6, 
p<0.001).
The median delay from receipt of the ﬁ  rst case noti-
ﬁ  cation until electronic ﬁ  ling of an outbreak report at the 
local health department was 4 days in 2002, 1 day in 2003, 
and 0 (i.e., same day) in 2004 and 2005. The median report-
ing delay from electronic ﬁ  ling of the outbreak report at the 
local health department to arrival of the electronic report at 
RKI was 1 day in 2002, 2 days in 2003, and 3 days in 2004 
and 2005. The overall median delay from receipt of the ﬁ  rst 
case notiﬁ  cation by the local health department until arrival 
of the electronic outbreak report at RKI remained stable at 
7 days from 2002 through 2005.
Discussion 
Effective surveillance of emerging infectious diseases 
requires a system able to transmit locally detected outbreak 
reports at an early stage, for example, when an epidemio-
logic investigation is still under way. The SurvNet outbreak 
surveillance system ensures continuous updating of the out-
break reports as more cases are identiﬁ  ed or linked to the 
outbreak, long before an outbreak investigation has been ﬁ  -
nalized in a written report. This system also facilitates rapid 
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Table 2. Total number of cases and outbreaks of notifiable disease, 2001–2005, Germany 
Data point  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 All
Total no. reported cases  245,133 284,425 252,119 267,130 291,680 1,340,487
No. (%) cases as part of reported 
outbreaks
22,146
(9.0)
67,498
(23.7)
48,855
(19.4)
58,204 (21.8) 57,017
(19.5)
253,720
(18.9)
No. outbreaks (any size) 3,981 6,914 6,261 6,340 7,082 30,578
No. (%) outbreaks with <5 cases 3,118 (78.3) 4,573 (66.1) 4,524 (72.3) 4,007 (63.2) 4,945 (69.8) 21,167 (69.2)
No. (%) outbreaks with >5 cases 863 (21.7) 2,341 (33.9) 1,737 (27.7) 2,333 (36.8) 2,137 (30.2) 9,411 (30.8)
Table 3. Size and median duration* of outbreaks by pathogen, 2001–2005, Germany 
Size of outbreak  Outbreak type,  
no. cases/median 
duration 2  3   4  5 6–9 10–49 50–99 >100 All
Salmonella 5,855/2 2,134/2 1,006/2 504/2 721/3 636/6 34/16 10/22.5 10,900/2
Norovirus 1,169/2 641/3 469/3 342/4 984/6 3,694/9 636/17 140/26 8,075/7
Rotavirus 2,570/3 941/4 425/6 176/7 396/8 532/13 28/29 2/49 5,070/4
Campylobacter 2,032/1 390/2 123/3 44/3 45/4 34/8 1/8 0 2,669/1
Mycobacterium  
tuberculosis
454/62.5 102/105 44/103 16/229.5 19/282 2/253.5 0 0 637/73
Influenza 420/2 163/3 67/3 19/6 17/5 25/15 2/38.5 0 713/3
Hepatitis A virus  227/18 102/22 42/23 33/44.5 32/51.5 7/106 1/77 1/106 445/22
Giardia 192/2.5 52/12.5 27/13 4/12 3/74 4/27 0 0 282/4
Salmonella 
paratyphi
13/2 3/20 0 0 0 1/40 0 0 17/4
Other 1,052/2 318/6 134/8 61/14 88/17 102/40 8/83.5 7/123 1,770/6
All pathogens  13,984/2 4,846/3 2,337/4 1,199/4 2,305/6 5,037/9 710/18 160/27 30,578/3
*Duration and median duration are given in full days. RESEARCH
electronic linkage of apparently independent outbreaks, for 
example, in different states, enabling subsequent analysis 
of the entire meta-outbreak. Although legally not consid-
ered an outbreak, single case notiﬁ  cations of rare diseases 
with strong public health implications (e.g., anthrax) will 
of course be captured through the SurvNet system as single 
case records and will result in immediate investigation and 
action by local authorities. 
During the past 5 years, the SurvNet outbreak surveil-
lance system has managed standardized collection, trans-
mission, and reporting of complex information generated 
by outbreak investigations of all 431 local health depart-
ments in Germany. As shown in this report, the system also 
covers diseases for which the causative pathogen is either 
not identiﬁ  able or identiﬁ  ed but not notiﬁ  able when occur-
ring sporadically. Local health departments become aware 
of such incidents because outbreaks or infections with new 
or unknown pathogens that are potentially dangerous to the 
public are also notiﬁ  able under German law. This ability 
makes SurvNet particularly useful for the surveillance of 
emerging infectious diseases for which laboratory diag-
nosis may often be delayed or not yet possible. SurvNet 
has the advantage of managing epidemiologic information 
that laboratory-based systems or syndromic surveillance 
systems alone cannot easily provide. Essential epidemio-
logic evidence can be retrieved only through local outbreak 
investigations that are usually conducted by local health 
departments (19), which constitute the most critical com-
ponent of outbreak detection and investigation. (3,5). 
The SurvNet system appears to capture far more out-
breaks per population than published collections of out-
break reports in other countries. For example, the Elec-
tronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System managed by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has 
listed 1,319 foodborne outbreaks in the year 2004 within 
the United States (estimated incidence rate of 0.4 outbreaks 
per 100,000) compared with 1,263 foodborne outbreaks 
captured in SurvNet in that same year in Germany (inci-
dence rate 1.5/100,000) (20). A similar difference is seen 
when comparing data from the SurvNet system in Germany 
with surveillance data on foodborne outbreaks in England 
and Wales or to the number of Salmonella outbreaks col-
lected by different surveillance systems in France (21–23). 
These differences could be due to different case deﬁ  ni-
tions, true difference in incidence caused by signiﬁ  cantly 
poorer food safety in Germany, or other reasons. However, 
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Table 4. Comparison among outbreaks, 2001–2005, Germany*  
Characteristic
Linked to notifiable 
pathogens
Linked to nonnotifiable 
pathogens
No link to any 
specific pathogen 
No. outbreaks   30,578 155 772
Median duration, d  3 9 4
Median no. cases per outbreak (minimum, maximum)  3 (2,527)  8 (2,153)  10 (2,110) 
Median duration from report of first case until outbreak 
report filed at local health department, d 
26,597 154 772
Median duration between filing of outbreak report at local 
health department until arrival of report at RKI, d 
10 0
Median duration from report of first case until outbreak 
report arrives at RKI, d 
22 3
*RKI, Robert Koch Institute. 
Table 5. Locations of outbreaks by pathogen, 2004 and 2005, Germany* 
No. (%) 
Location
Norovirus  
(n = 3,141) 
Salmonella spp. 
(n = 2,703) 
Rotavirus 
(n = 1,985) 
Campylobacter
spp. (n = 1,005) 
Hepatitis A
(n = 139) 
Others
(n = 973) 
All
(n = 9,946) 
Household 395 (13)  1,993 (73)  1,338 (67)  758 (75)  102 (72)  676 (69)  5,262 (53) 
Nursing home  1,040 (33)  24 (1)  136 (7)  5 (0)  0 (0)  13 (1)  1,218 (12) 
Kindergarten 368 (12)  61 (2)  290 (15)  7 (1)  9 (6)  48 (5)  783 (8) 
Hospital, laboratory  1,035 (33)  20 (1)  175 (9)  5 (0)  1 (1)  12 (1)  1,248 (12) 
Hotel, cruise ship  58 (2)  169 (6)  16 (1)  120 (12)  12 (8)  93 (9)  468 (5) 
Restaurant 72 (2)  258 (9)  1 (0)  48 (5)  3 (2)  10 (1)  392 (4) 
Other location  34 (1)  80 (3)  28 (1)  36 (4)  7 (5)  61 (6)  246 (2) 
School, university  34 (1)  18 (1)  0 7 (1)  8 (6)  20 (2)  87 (1) 
Special event, festival, etc.  24 (1)  55 (2)  4 (0)  9 (1)  0 6 (1)  98 (1) 
Work place  37 (1)  21 (1)  0 10 (1)  0 17 (2)  85 (1) 
Dormitory, military casern  56 (2)  9 (0)  9 (0)  1 (0)  0 11 (1)  86 (1) 
Bus/ train, etc.  2 (0)  5 (0)  0 4 (0)  0 2 (0)  13 (0) 
Prison  2 (0)  4 (0)  3 (0)  0 0 3 (0)  12 (0) 
Refugee camp  0 2 (0)  0 0 0 8 (1)  10 (0) 
Total number of listed items  3,157 (100)  2,719 (100)  2,000 (100)  1,010 (100)  142 (100)  980 (100)  10,008 (100)
*Outbreaks may be reported in >1 location. Electronic Surveillance for Infectious Disease Outbreaks
the higher outbreak incidence rate in the SurvNet system 
is likely the result of its higher sensitivity, at least in part. 
Technically, the system is an integral part of the routine 
surveillance for notiﬁ  able diseases, which means that lo-
cal health departments are required to enter and administer 
only outbreak-related data, because most of the informa-
tion from the database of notiﬁ  able disease cases is being 
used in both systems. This synergism is likely to encourage 
local health departments to use the system and thus im-
prove its sensitivity. Because all of the outbreaks identi-
ﬁ  ed in this system are events identiﬁ  ed and investigated 
by local public health staff, the positive predictive value 
of detecting a true outbreak is likely to remain high. This 
is one of the major advantages of SurvNet compared with 
outbreak detection systems based on statistical algorithms 
of case reports. Data from SurvNet may, in fact, serve as 
the standard to validate statistical outbreak detection al-
gorithms (24). SurvNet may also provide data to identify 
prognostic criteria that would help in forecasting the natu-
ral development of a speciﬁ  c outbreak (25–28). However, 
details of outbreak reports have not yet been systematically 
validated, so careful interpretation of the information is es-
sential. Compared with CDC’s outbreak reports analyzed 
by Ashford and colleagues, the SurvNet system appears to 
be much timelier, although a direct comparison is not pos-
sible because the types of investigated outbreaks and the 
deﬁ  nitions of the reporting delays are not directly compa-
rable (5). 
The European Food and Safety Authority is currently 
building a reporting system for foodborne outbreaks in the 
European Union using the methods developed in SurvNet 
(pers. comm., P.Mäkelä, European Food Safety Authority). 
The Eurocode 2 System used here to categorize food ap-
pears to be user friendly and is available on the Internet 
with instructions on how to categorize food items that ap-
pear difﬁ  cult to assign to 1 category (14). Most outbreaks 
registered in this system were caused by pathogens of the 
gastrointestinal tract, yet only for a minor portion was re-
liable evidence available linking these outbreaks to food. 
This reminds us that outbreaks caused by gastroenteric 
pathogens, particularly those caused by norovirus, should 
not be overinterpreted as foodborne outbreaks. 
Our data suggest that only 11.3% of reported expo-
sures in outbreaks with >10 cases were statistically signiﬁ  -
cant and associated with the outbreak through case-control 
or cohort studies. In 37% of the reported foodborne out-
breaks in SurvNet, the reporting local health departments 
were able to associate a meal but not a speciﬁ  c food item 
with the outbreak. Similarly, Jones et al. have observed 
that most foodborne outbreak investigations in the Unit-
ed States did not identify a speciﬁ  c food item (10). Local 
health departments must be motivated to improve outbreak 
investigations to increase the validity of the information re-
ceived through this system (29). In addition to intensifying 
training programs for the local public health service, RKI 
is currently developing support tools, such as predesigned 
electronic line lists of cases and decision-supporting algo-
rithms, to be included in the SurvNet system. Additional 
training and support tools will assist local health depart-
ment personnel in the use of epidemiologic methods for 
outbreak investigations. A new information technology 
structure will facilitate these additions and further improve 
the timeliness of the system. 
SurvNet has the advantage of being able to document 
complex multistate outbreaks of any cause. For example, 
SurvNet was able to capture an outbreak of 1,024 cases of 
epidemic conjunctivitis, which started within the German 
armed forces and spread to the civilian population through-
out the country (30). Comparatively few of the reported 
outbreaks (3%) were linked to nonnotiﬁ  able pathogens or 
could not be linked to speciﬁ  c pathogens at all. However, 
this demonstrates that SurvNet is able to cover outbreaks 
caused by unknown or emerging infectious diseases. 
Outbreak surveillance of SurvNet has already provided 
valuable information for topics of public health relevance. 
By conﬁ  rming and quantifying the increase of hospital-
based norovirus outbreaks in recent years, SurvNet has 
contributed to the development of speciﬁ  c recommenda-
tions on how to prevent and control norovirus outbreaks in 
hospitals and nursing homes (31–33). In 2006, a sharp in-
crease of norovirus outbreak reports was noted at RKI from 
reporting weeks 43 through 47. This led to a countrywide 
alert in the national weekly epidemiologic bulletin in week 
48 and was subsequently echoed by an alert throughout Eu-
rope in the Eurosurveillance Weekly Journal 2 weeks later 
(34–35).
Although our report cannot replace a surveillance sys-
tem evaluation, some system attributes can be addressed. 
Over a period of 5 years, SurvNet has demonstrated the 
ability to collect and analyze a large number of outbreak 
reports in a federal administrative environment of 431 lo-
cal health departments and 16 federal states in Germany 
with a total population of 82 million inhabitants. This fact 
already indicates that requirements of simplicity, accept-
ability, and stability appear to have been met. SurvNet also 
seems to compare favorably to other systems in timeliness 
and sensitivity. The ability of SurvNet to capture outbreaks 
with unidentiﬁ  ed or new pathogens in a systematic way in-
dicates its suitability for outbreak surveillance of emerging 
infectious diseases. Given the federal structure in Germany 
and its reﬂ  ection in the SurvNet design, this system might 
also be a blueprint for other large national or international 
outbreak surveillance systems, particularly in the context 
of the new international health regulations.
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